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Article 1

ARTICLE

ON THE PRACTICAL MEANING OF SECULARISM
John Finnis*
I
"Secular" is a word minted by Latin Christians.' Translating the
New Testament, Jerome used it for Greek words signifying the affairs
of this world, sometimes neutrally the world of time rather than eternity, 2 and the daily life of any human society,3 sometimes pejoratively
as matters which distract us from realities and dispositions of lasting
worth. 4 Aquinas uses it regularly, and often quite without negative
connotations: he will say, for example, that in matters which concern
the good of the political community (bonum civile), Christians should
generally obey the directives of the secular rather than the ecclesiastical authorities. 5
Aquinas is pointing out a distinction of competences which exemplifies a social process of differentiation that goes much wider. Modem historians and sociologists have often called this wider social
process "secularization." Fields of life in which human enterprises
and conditions were once scarcely within human control-bodily
health, or the sowing of crops-become more or less subject to natural-scientific understanding and technological control, and attempts
to manage them instead by prayer (as in Mary Baker Eddy's Christian
Science) are laid aside as misdirected. This secularization commonly
* Biolchini Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. This article was
originally delivered as a lecture to a conference, "Secularism and the Common
Good," April 15, 1997, at Notre Dame Law School.
1 In classical Latin the word saecularisnever acquired the range of meanings of
saeculum, which does extend to "the world" in most of our senses of the word.
2 See 2 Timothy 1:9; Titus 1:2.
3 See 1 Corinthians6:3-4.
4 See 2 Timothy 2:4; Titus 2:12
5 See II Sclu, ruM SUPER LIBROS SzNTEi'rnRUM [SmEr.] d. 44 exp. textus ad 4:
"magis obediendum potestati saeculari quam spirituali"
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accompanies, therefore, the processes of urbanization and industrialization, which in turn promote the specialization of competence and
the organizational autonomy that are required in directing complex
communities and their politics. That theocracy is a recipe for mismanagement becomes clear even for people not governed by the
firmly differentiating directive, "Render to Caesar the things of Caesar
Neither the differentiating of the secular from the sacred, nor the
social processes of secularization, entail the mind-set or cluster of ideologies we call "secularism." Like any significant reality, this mind-set
is not tied to any one word or to the accidents of semantics. Without
benefit of "secular" or cognate terms, Plato has provided us with a
profound analysis of secularism. In his great last work, Laws, he
sketches a cluster of dispositions which shape up around one or another of three propositions: there is no God; no God has any concern
with human affairs; or any such divine concern with the human is easily appeased by a superficial piety and requires no demanding reform
of human vice. 6 The corresponding character types described by
Plato are well recognisable in more recent times. And the three propositions-no God; God absent; and God soft-spirited 7-match
closely modem secularism's characteristic forms: atheism; a deistic assumption that human history knows no divine intervention, s no revelation of God's intentions for us; and a "liberal" religiosity which
presumes upon divine benevolence, and has no time for warnings of
the alienation from God inherent in immorality and potentially final
(as Plato too warns in his prophetic meditation on wrongdoing's retribution, the Republic's myth of Er.9 )

Though Plato's strongest indignation is reserved for the position
ascribing to God a soft-spirited fatuity contemptible in men and women, his most vigorous argumentation confronts the first and second
positions, which deny mind's sway in the cosmos. Atheistic materialism's claim that all is ultimately sheer chance and brute inexplicable
necessity truncates the investigative quest of science and philosophy
for intelligibility and explanation wherever it can be found. And deis6 See PLATO, LAWS X 885b, 888c, 901d, 902e-903a, 908b-d, 909a-b. Plato usually
speaks of "gods" or "the gods," but when getting to the heart of the matter he switches
to talk of God or "the god." Id. at 902e, 903d, 910b.
7 See id. at X 901e, 903a; see also PLATO, REPUBLIC 365d-e.
8 ["T] his very axiom, miracles do not happen, comes near the heart of that elusive shift in the European mind which we seek" in investigating the secularization of
the European mind in the nineteenth century. OWEN CHADWICK, THE SECULARIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN MIND IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

9

See

REPUBLIC

17 (1975).

X 614b-621d; see also LAws 903d; PLATO,

GORGIAS

523a-527e.
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tic denial of all-governing divine providence underestimates the allcreative, all-sustaining, and all-penetrating power of the maker's practical intellect.
But Plato judges that the practical significance of the three positions is in each case essentially the same: the withering away of reverence for God, of a steady, uncringing, inspiriting fear of the Lord. 10
We can readily see that secularism, in this practical inner manifestation or resultant, is part of the makeup even of a God-fearing believer,
just insofar as one is sinning. In that sense, as Maritain could consider
the Church a reality which occupies a part of the believer's spirit, so
one can think of secularism as a kind of deficiency detectable to a
greater or lesser degree in every human soul except the authentic
saints'. All of us, with our friends and colleagues, seem to live in some
sense as secularists; we have motives of sympathy and affection, as well
as reasons of principle, to turn sharply aside from Plato when he plans
fierce penal repression of secularists by the Guardians of the Laws."
The secularism I consider in this Article is a public reality, the
secularism which shapes public debate, deliberation, dispositions, and
action, and dominates our education and culture. I shall be considering the ideas, not the people; and people are often less consistent,
and better, than their theories. There is no profit in estimating
whether secularism's dominance now is greater than in Plato's Athens
or lesser than in Stalin's Leningrad. There is certainly a rich field for
historical investigation of the particular and often peculiar forms
taken by western secularism under the influence of the faith it supplants. But I shall not try to resume or repeat the illuminating investigations carried forward by De Lubac, Voegelin, 12 Fabro, Maclntyre,
Chadwick, and many others. Still less do Ijoin in the game of declaring this a post-modem, or post-baroque, or post-Christian, or historically-minded and post-classicist 3 era, period, age or epoch. Instead I
want to explore secularism's practical significance, as it can be illuminated by understanding practical reason itself. We try to carry folward
that understanding when we reflect on the basic reasons for action,
10 See LAws XII 967d: "bebais theosebis." Plato does not speak of the Lord; but the
divine "mover of the pieces" (petteutes) has a similar dignity. Id. at 903d.
11 See id. at X 907d-910d.
12 See ERIC VOEGELIN, FROM ENLIGHTNMENT TO REVOLUTION (John H. Hallowell
ed., 1975).
13 On the ambiguities and misconceptions in the "classicist v. historically-minded"
distinction adopted by Bernard Lonergan SJ (and thence many Catholic theologians)
from the secularist historian Carl Becker's lectures at Yale Law School in 1931-32, see
JOHN FINNIs, "HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS" AND THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 1-33
(1992).
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the first principles (as Aquinas calls them) of natural law, on the
choices, intentions, and commitments they guide and shape, and on
the personal dignity of a being who can respond either integrally and
reasonably or arbitrarily and deviantly to their intelligibility and
directiveness.
II

What do I mean by "directiveness"? Well, if one inquires into
one's own and other people's achievements, and into the range of
one's opportunities, the question "Why? For what reason?" will, if resolutely pressed, disclose a set of primary reasons for action. Like
other reasons, these have a propositional form. The propositions pick
out, and direct one towards, basic human goods, as opportunities-tobe-pursued, worthwhile to attain and maintain by one's acting, and
giving point to everything one does. Thus, for example, the basic
human good of knowledge is a reason for action and correspondingly
the content or subject-matter of a primary principle whose directiveness can be articulated in the form, "Knowledge of truth is a good to
be pursued." And similarly for the other basic human goods, such as
life, marriage, friendship and peace with others, skill in work or play,
and practical reasonableness. This directiveness of these first practical
principles-the intelligibility of these primary goods precisely as to-bepursued-is original; the goods are understood as good each for its
own sake and in their own right, not as mere means to some further
good.
Still, each of the basic goods is an aspect of human fulfilment or
flourishing, and each is a good whoever the human persons in whom
it is or can be instantiated. So reason further grasps the notion of an
integral human fulfilment, i.e. the fulfilment of every human person
and community in all the basic goods. This notion does not signify a
new basic good or reason for action, and does not point to a goal
attainable by human planning and cooperation. But it does express
the object (or subject-matter) of the combined directiveness of all the
basic human goods taken together. The good of practical reasonableness, which Aristotle called phronesis and Aquinas prudentia (with its
object the "good of practical reasonableness" [bonum rationis]), directs
us to accept the integral directiveness of all the first practical principles, and not to allow emotions and sub-rational feelings to fetter or
deflect it. And this integral directiveness of the first principles of practical reason can be articulated in a primary or master moral principle:
all one's willing should be compatible with integral human fulfilment
(the fulfilment of all human persons in all communities)-a highly
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abstract formulation of the more well-known statement that one
should love and respect one's neighbor as oneself. High-level moral
principles such as the Golden Rule or the principle forbidding intentional infliction of harms are, then, specifications (themselves in many
cases further specifiable) of that primary or master moral principle;
they identify forms of willing incompatible with a steady and undeflected will for integral human fulfilment. So the directiveness of
the first principles is both rationally motivating (contra Hume and
Kant), and morally restraining (as well as spurring on).
Thus one finds oneself being directed, as a matter of intelligence
and reason. In this sense, the first practical principles, though not
innate prior to all experience, have the status of givens- "given to"
and grasped in our understanding. Both in their directiveness and
their "self-evidence" as knowable without deduction from higher
premises, these principles have a kind of necessity. But as the propositional content of the acts of insight by which one comes to understand
these opportunities and reasons for action (and of one's consequent
habitual knowledge), the first practical principles-and likewise the
master moral principle (with its specifications in less abstract moral
principles) -are like all the other realities within our experience. For
those acts of insight (understanding) are the actuation of a potentiality, and contingent on something which explains that change from
potentiality to act(uality). So, like every reality which we can think of
as what it is without knowing that it is, the practical principles have an
actuality which calls for explanation, and that explanation can only be
a reality whose what-it-is includes that it is, and so is without shadow of
mere potentiality or of change from possibility to act(uality).14
And since the first practical principles not only are but are directive, and their directiveness cannot be explained by anything subhuman or by any human originating, it is also reasonable to conclude
that the ultimate explanation or first cause which accounts for their
being also accounts, of itself, for their directiveness. This inference is
not to be confused with the contention of Kant's posthumous papers,
or ofJohn Henry Newman, that the commanding voice of, or in, one's
conscience requires one to conclude to a transcendent commander.
Kant and Newman were heirs to a long tradition of voluntarist misunderstanding of directiveness and "ought" as ultimately a matter of
commands or imperatives. In truth, first practical principles direct us
to intelligent acts of will intending human flourishing. So we must
14 See GRIuN GRisEz, BEYOND Tm NEv THEisM: A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
36-91 (1975); JoHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW & NATURAL RIGHTs 378-88 (1980); JOHN
FINNIS, AQuINAs ch. X (1998).
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take the first cause of their directiveness to be a non-human intelligence and will-we can only say, person-directingus thus towards our
own goods, towards human fulfilment.
An argument to the existence of God from the data of practical
reason converges, of course, with the more familiar arguments from
other realities in which change and contingency are more evident.
The conclusion on which all converge with a rational necessity15 is
that everything within our experience, including every form of intelligibility which (like the first practical principles) is prior to human willing, has as its ultimate explanation the still active action of divine
creation. Here I should recall the warning of St. Thomas, taken up
with full seriousness in Germain Grisez's restatement of the philosophy of God. We can have no understanding of what a being is in
which what it is includes that it is. So "we cannot know what God is,
but only what God is not"16 "and how other things are related to
God. ' 17 Whatever we say about God must be taken with a drastic shift
of meaning leaving nothing but what must be predicated of God to
explain the very existence and character of the realities within our
experience. But clearly we must predicate of God this act(ion) of Creation as the projection of immense structures and patterns of intelligibility, structures and patterns whose intelligibility still far outreaches
natural and mathematical sciences dedicated to disclosing it. We
must take divine creation to be somehow an act which carries out an
intention. And it is an act which cannot have been necessitated. Being free from every trace of potentiality, lack, imperfection, or need,
the Creator must be of a perfection that cannot conceivably be enhanced. So the creating of a universe-this or any other-could not
be required, by any reason whatever. So the intention to create and
sustain our universe must be somehow the adoption of a proposal by
truly unnecessitated, free choice. Plato's Laws insists, and sketches a
demonstration, that mind is the primary explanation of the cosmos.
This argument is resumed in Aquinas' "fifth way," and in the vindication of God's existence in John Haldane's recent dialectic with JJ.C.
Smart18-a resumption deepened by Christian philosophy's clarity
about Creation: the primary explanation of the cosmos involves both
15 This is a mattei not of logical necessity, but of requirements of rationality in
seeking explanatory knowledge ("rationality norms"). See GRISEz, NEW THEISM, supra
note 14, at 132-36, 168-72; FINNis, HisroRIcAL CONSCIOUSNESS, supra note 13, at
17-23.
16 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE [ST] I q. 3 prol.; see also THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES [ScG] I c. 14 nn. 2-3 [117-8].
17 ScG I c. 30 n. 4 [278].
18 SeeJ.J.C. SMART &JOHN HALDANE, ATHEISM & THEISM (1996).
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intellect and will, a reason not merely contemplative but fully
practical.
In reflecting on divine Creation we can go further in understanding the givenness of our practical reason's first principles. They outline for us the aspects of human flourishing, as object(ive)s of
intelligent action. And, as Aquinas never tires of reminding us, it is by
understanding objects of action that we understand action, and only
by understanding a being's action can we understand its capacities,
and only by understanding its capacities can we understand its nature.
So our practical understanding of the basic goods, the primary objects
of all intelligent action, is an indispensable source of our understanding of human nature. But in turn that nature-by which we have the
capacitieswe have, and can do what we can do, for the forms offlourishing available by our activities-is obviously a sheer given. It is an outcome-via what processes of evolution matters not at all for a
reflection on these fundamentals-the outcome of God's free choice
to create. Integral human fulfilment, indeed any human fulfilment
however fragmentary, will be the outcome of that same free choice,
accompanying and sustaining our own unnecessitated free choices.
These valid inferences are available even to urbanized people in a
fully differentiated, technologically organized way of life. Those who
live closer to the givens of nature, say farming or fishing, can more
immediately apprehend the conditions of and limits upon our capabilities, the radical and constant dependence of successful human
work on the collaboration of nature, that is, of the divine providence
which today, as completely as at the Big Bang, both originates and
shapes our materials, our efforts, and their combined productiveness.
A further basic human good is most readily within their understanding and interest, the good of harmony with the transcendent source of
every other human good, and every form of fruitfulness. As harmony
of minds and wills with the transcendent mind and will, this collaboration is nothing less than a community, not the less real for being between utterly unequal persons. This sense of community is the heart
of what is often called "natural religion."
Human understanding of that natural community of divine and
human beings was transformed by Jewish and Christian faith, which
displays and denounces the illusoriness of the "strange gods"-those
products of an awareness of mind's omnipresence in nature, but an
awareness dominated by imagination, and an imagination marked by
the forms of habitual immorality mirrored in the sexual and other
laxities of the gods and left unchallenged by idols capable neither of
saving nor condemning. The created world, as grasped by human understanding, science, and technique, is now radically de-divinized, for
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God-the only divinity to be affirmed by a truth-seeking reason-is
utterly transcendent, both to our understanding and to every reality
within range of our experience, even though divine action must by its
unnecessitated causality be somehow utterly intimate to every thisworldly structure and event. The saeculum, this contingent world and
its time, is differentiated from its sole origin's eternal act of uncontingent being. We can no longer make room, as Plato still did in
speech, for the pagan gods, and we cannot envisage a this-worldly
community with ancestors or other spirits of material bodies; New Age
outpourings cannot now be more than make-believe.
Moreover, the natural community of humankind with God, and
the productive divine collaboration which natural religion prays for,
are extended and deepened in the revelation completed in Christ.
For this revelation is not merely a communication about the nature of
things, but also and primarily the offering, and on our side the accepting, in faith, of a covenant. Perhaps the philosophy of law has
something to contribute at this point. Of course, the covenant offered by the true God is radically different from a bargain, and transfigures our ideas and institutions of promise and contract. Still, the
climate of secularist indifference to anything like a covenant between
God and humankind has left us all struggling to explain and vindicate
Contract as a valid category irreducible to Tort, Restitution, or Welfare Law. And we can, I think, make progress by revisiting Aquinas'
insight that promising, like praying and legislating, is fundamentally
an act of practical reason. Take legislating: this is essentially an act of
reason, projecting an intelligible and reasonable order of future conduct and consequent benefits, yet also for the most part a sheer
determinatiowhereby one amongst two or more "equally" 19 reasonable
options (proposals) is adopted by creative choice (will) for the sake of
common good (nor least friendship and justice). So too the making
of a promise by offer and acceptance is more fundamentally an act of
reason than of will.2° The offer on which valid contracts are characteristically founded projects an intelligible order of relationships between the parties in respect of some course of conduct by each of
them for the sake of intelligible benefits for each; the corresponding
acceptance by which such contracts are brought into being as sets of
mutual obligations is, like the offer, an assent-a saying Yes-to that
order of relationships and to the course of conduct which is the precise subject-matter of that order, and Yes to the proposal that as from
19 Properly speaking, "incommensurably" rather than "equally." SeeJOSEPH RAZ,
THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM, ch. 13, esp. pp.

20 ST II-I q. 88 a. 1c.

325-26 (1986).
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this moment all the parties be able (entitled) to count the whole future relationship (and especially the future conduct, the obligations,
of any other party) as part of their present stock of benefits, their
"own," their "right(s)."

That affirming Yes is not in vain, unless we are to say that persons
simply lack the ability to confer on each other the present benefit of
such rights to future beneficial conduct. The Yes indeed affirms that it
is not in vain. So, if it is not to be mere impotent folly-or else a lie,
sundering both the harmony of outer with inner self and the harmony, the trust, between speaker and hearer(s)-the assent of offer
and acceptance must bring into being, create, the relationships, including the rights, the obligations of fidelity and commitment, which
it projects and affirms. Still, the intention to undertake such obligations, and the communicated promise, presuppose the basic reasons
for action, the basic human goods at stake (including friendship and/
or justice) and the requirements of fairness (the Golden Rule).
Whenever one knows that one's expression of intention will arouse
another's hopes, one has some responsibility in fairness or friendship-quite independently of the practice of promising-not to disappoint those hopes. In making a promise one focuses attention on
one's consciousness of responsibility not to disappoint the other, and
one thereby greatly increases the extent to which friendship orjustice
is at stake, and so also intentionally increases one's responsibility (ob21
ligation) to the other person.
God's promises, even more radically than ours, engage their
maker's truthfulness, for the whole time of the promise's fulfilment
lies open to God's view, so that his "I will" excludes any change of
mind in future circumstances. The duplicity in any affirming or asserting at odds with the virtue of veritas is such an evil that the divine
perfection must exclude it. Now in God's covenants, old and new, the
benefits promised by God are identified as dependent upon our own
adherence to the relationship and the conduct it demands of usessentially, as the new covenant (perfecting the old) makes clear, the
demands already inherent in the natural law, together with willingness
to participate in the Lord's own saving acts as they extend through
history in the life of his ecclesia.22 Plato's special disgust at the third
impious proposition, that God can be bought off, would surely extend
21 GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS VOL. 2, LIVING A CHRiSTIAN LIE
412 (1993); see also FINNis, NATURAL LAW, supra note 14, at 298-308.
22 On the old and new covenants, see Louis BOUYER, THE CHURCH OF GOD: BODY
OF CHRisr'AND TEMLE OF THE SPImrr (1982); GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD
JESUS VOL. 1, CHRIsTLAN MORAL PRINCIPLES 507-16 (1983).
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to the assumption widespread among Christians today, that the Lord's
warnings about final judgment are wholly or largely bluff.
Secularised Christian views about this seem, in fact, to oscillate
between variants of Plato's second and third forms of impiety. Either
the benefits God has promised and the loss he has warned against are
undeliverable, are outside the reach of his power and providence, or
God is supposed to be quite complaisant and unconcerned about
moral integrity in communicating his covenant's conditions. Its
promises will be delivered whether we keep our side or instead do
exactly what we please. Thus the covenant relationship is treated as,
on God's side, manipulation by empty warnings; von Balthasar, in his
rough polemics about hell, misdescribes these as "threats" and treats
them as bluffs. 23 His thought remains trapped in the false alternatives
presented by the pervasive voluntarist misunderstanding of law,
promises, practical reason and thus of the relation between Creator
and created persons. Von Balthasarjoins the secularist's understandable flight from the voluntarists' God, who chooses to inflict the pains
of hell on those who disobey the divine commands; but, being still in
the grip of that voluntarist legalism so widespread among Christians in
recent centuries, he develops an argument which, like the assumptions of secularised Christians, fails to understand God as having real
concern for what truly benefits us, and fails to understand the divine
law's wisdom and goodness as directing us how to save ourselves from
injuring ourselves and one another by choices incompatible with
24
openness to integral human fulfilment.
On our side, the secularist emptying out of the covenant has
more than one kind of practical implication. On the one hand, it can
result in a generalising of the manipulation found in every act of
wrongdoing, even independently of revelation and covenant. For, as
natural religion is more or less aware, in doing wrong one takes the
goods provided by divine providence and exploits them without regard to the integral directiveness of the principles of practical reasonableness, principles which (as we have seen) point even natural
religion towards an acknowledgement of that providence. 25 This exploitativeness can be generalised and radicalised in a kind of secularised Christian thought: "Let's eat, drink, and be merrym-do just
what we feel like-for tomorrow we live forever!" But the emptying
23

See HANS URS VON BALTHASAR, DARE WE HOPE "THAT ALL MEN BE SAVED"? WITH

(1988).
See the analysis and critique of Balthasar's position on hell in GERMAIN GRisEz,
THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS VOL. 3, DIFFICULT MORAL QUESTIONS 21-28 (1997).
25 See Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, & John Finnis, Practical Principles, Moral
Truth, and UltimateEnds, 32 AM. J. JuRis. 99, 141-47 (1987).
A SHORT TREATISE ON HELL

24
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out of the covenant's conditions can have results less radical and consistent. Practical reasonableness, the natural law written on the heart,
was brightly illuminated by the revelation that there is a Kingdom of
God which transfigures the natural ideal of integral human fulfilment
and has terms of citizenship extending and deepening natural love of
neighbour as oneself. That illumination invites our will's response,
and does not fade away, leaving the will relaxed and content, as soon
as revelation is rejected or radically misapprehended in secularising
"enlightenment." So there emerges an earnestly secular Christianity
which is not readily distinguishable from secular humanism; for in
each the hope of heaven has disappeared from practical life as completely as fear of hell.
And this practical elimination of a transcendent hope should be
no surprise. If X will happen, or not happen, regardless of anything
one does, one cannot intend X. So, if one assumes that either everyone reaches heaven regardless, or heaven is mere myth, we know not
which, then one cannot intend heaven. Hope, not as dream unconnected with practical deliberation and choice, but as standing intention of shaping one's choices and actions in the hope of being made
fit for the integral human fulfilment-the life of heaven-on offer in
the covenant, becomes impossible.2 6 So it is practical reason's own
logic that makes inevitable the shift from "Christianity" without fear of
hell (and so with certitude of heaven) to Christianity without hope of
heaven (and so with some this-worldly hope)-the shift to secularism
so widespread among so-called liberal Christians (andJews), especially
perhaps those who happen to be theologians or ecclesiastical
bureaucrats.
Since public reason in the United States is shaped within a culture of subscription to the religions of the new or the old covenants,
this religiose secularism has far-reaching practical consequences for
your common good.
III

I have sketched some reasons (there are others) why the recognition that practical reason is grounded in God clarifies the goodness of
the basic human goods, the freedom of free choice, and the reality of
intention (irreducible to desire or foresight), and enhances, accordingly, the directiveness of the first practical principles, the coherence
and inherent force of moral principles, and the perfecting of interpersonal collaboration in the making and fulfilment of promises.
26 See the very important analysis of the proper integration of hope and fear in
Christian life in GRisEz, CHRItSTIN LIFE, supra note 21, at 91-94.
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Before turning to secularism's practical implications, I should indicate
why that recognition also clarifies and enhances the equal dignity of
all human persons.
To think of the freedom and practical intelligence involved in the
creation and providential sustaining of everything out of nothing is to
think of the reality of spirit-a reality to us most comprehensible and
yet most incomprehensible. And, it is by thinking about one's own
27
intelligent and free actingthat one most directly and securely grasps
something which secularism has lost its grip upon. In its understanding of the human person, secularism (in the functionally atheistic
form that was Plato's first target and today is dominant in university
culture) oscillates between dualism and materialism. Dualism and
materialism, each in its own way, deny the unity of the person (I, the
bodily self) who lives, wants, chooses, tries, understands, senses, feels,
moves, and is moved, as animated body, rational animal. They are
each inconsistent with the data they seek to explain and with the
thinker's own performance in choosing to seek and put forward explanations. 28 The only explanation consistent with our ability to choose,
to seek, to find, and to communicate explanations is one which, like
the accounts of human soul by Aristotle and Aquinas, identifies a form
and lifelong act(uality) by which the matter of my bodily makeup is
constituted the unified and active subject (me myself). As one experiences in making and carrying out a choice such as giving this lecture
and so uttering this sentence audibly now, the one factor unifying and
activating one's living individual reality is a factor at once animal (sentient and self-locomotive) and intellectual (understanding, self-understanding, and, even in the conduct of thinking, self-determining by
judging and choosing).29 Though the manifold activations of these
27 Prior to all accounts of it, this intelligible presence of my many-faceted acting
self to myself is a datum of understanding; one and the same I-this human beingwho am understanding and choosing and carrying out my choice and sensing, etc., is
a reality I already truly understand, albeit not yet fully (explanatorily, with elaboration). SeeAQuINAS, ST I q. 76 a. 1c; q. 87 a. 4c; q. 86 a. 1 ad 3; III SENT.d. 23 q. I a. 2

ad 3;

FINNIS, AQUINAS,

supra note 14, at 176-79.

28 See DAVID BRAINE, THE HUMAN PERSON: ANIMAL AND SPIRIT (1994). For Aquinas' argument from the self-refutation of those who held that there is but one intellect, see THOMAS AQUINAS, DE UNITATE INTELLECrUs III 62, 79 (see R. McINERN ,
AQUINAS AGAINST THE AvERRoIsTs: ON THERE BEING ONLY ONE INTELLEcr

80-1, 94-5

(1995)).
29 Thus: "the principle by which we understand is intellect.., so this must be
united to one's body as form, not indeed in such a way that the capacity of understanding is the act of some organ, but because it is a power of one's soul, which is the
act of a physical and organic body." AQUINAS, INTELLEcUs III, supra note 27, at 80
(McINERNY, supranote 28, at 96-7). On soul as the primary "act" of a living, physically
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bodily and rational powers depend upon one's physical maturity and
health, the reality and powers of the soul are given to each of us complete (as wholly undeveloped, radical capacities) at the outset of his or
her existence as such. 0 And here we have the root of our dignity as
human beings, not as a "status" to be conferred or withdrawn, but a
reality to be acknowledged in every member of our species. This is
indeed a truth already implicit in one's understanding of basic reasons for choice and action. For these reasons each direct us to goods
good for me and anyone like m--anyone who shares my nature, any
human being.
Dignity connotes both superiority (e.g. in power, excellence, status) and intrinsic, non-dependent worth.3 1 The radical capacity and
act(uality) which each human being has by virtue of his or her individual rational soul makes each of us superior in the straightforward
sense that we thereby have and instantiate every level of being-physical solidity and dynamisms, chemical and biological complexity and
self-directedness, and more. the capacity to understand all these other
realities, to reason about them and about reasoning itself, to replicate
and transform other beings on all those levels of reality, and with selfmastery's freedom to choose these activities as part of choosing how to
live. As for inherent worth, its paradigm is our living, knowing, playing, and loving, and the good we grasp in our friend's (and thus in
every human person's) very being.
In short: materialist secularism's denials or determined agnosticism about soul and species radically misrepresent our experience as
choosers-an experience internal and private, but shared in kind,
common to us all, and in that sense in the public domain of philosophical reflection and discussion. This materialism likewise renders
unintelligible the public and private judgment that "by nature all
human beings are equal," and that there are human rights and requirements of justice which do not discriminate between male and
female, intelligent and dull, race and race, young and old, healthy
and infirm. All around us we find talk of human rights. But this can't
hide the hollowness and fragility of rights to equal treatment, or opportunities, or concern and respect, on the assumptions of materialorganized body, see, e.g., AQUINAS, ScG II c. 61 n. 2 [1397]; ST I q. 76 a. 4 ad 1;
1.1 n. 15 [227-9].
30 The intellectual (and sensory and vegetative) soul by the creation of which I

THOMAS AQUINAS, COMM. IN DE ANIMA

came into existence-existence as already a person-is not itself a person but only a
"part" (uniquely, the organizing part and indeed the very form and act) of me. AQUINAS, ST I q. 29 a. 1 ad 5; q. 75 a. 4 ad 2.
31 "'Dignity' signifies something's goodness for its own sake (Propterseipsum)." III
SENT. at d. 35 q. 1 a. 4 sol. 1c.
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ism, assumptions which are secularism's philosophically most popular
basis-or is it consequence?
We see this loss of grip on human equality's basis in the will to
treat the unborn-whose reality and nature is known to us better than
ever before-as utterly without constitutional rights, and disposable at
whim, simply because they are physically located within or even partially within their mother's womb. In the work of secularist philosophers like Peter Singer, what in the Supreme Court'sjudgments about
abortion is shameless evasion becomes instead a firmly asserted thesis:
there are non-human animals who rank higher in status, dignity, and
entitlement than newborn and other very young human children.
And the widespread shift of thought and sentiment towards euthanasia proceeds in part on the assumption-characteristically secularist in
its unstable amalgam of materialism and dualism-that with irretrievable loss of consciousness the life of the person is not only deprived of
all worth but actually has come to an end.

IV
Philosophy's search for explanations yields the inference that our
universe, including our practical understanding, its principles, and
that inherent responsiveness to understood goods which we call will,
all have as first cause a creative practical intellect and will. God's selfdisclosure in the historical revelation completed in Christ teaches us
to understand our practical reason and will-and indeed our whole
life, by which rational soul as fundamental act(uality) of the body animates every aspect of our bodiliness-as an image of God's reason,
will, and life (an existence unrefracted, however, by body's susceptibility to being acted upon and changed by division or augmentation).
And our freedom includes, like God's, the capacity to envisage and
bring into being a new order of inter-personal relationships, by covenants that bind. The world as understood in secularism is not open to
these realities, or at least (in the case of secularised religiosity) takes
them too lightly to matter.
John Haldane has raised what he rightly calls "the interesting
question to what extent those who deny the reality of causation are
moved to do so by a concern to block" a certain type of proof of the
existence of God.3 2 Without pursuing that hypothesis about motivation ("concern") as a cause of theoretical positions, I want simply to
take note of certain practical positions-including positions within
the theory or philosophy or indeed the theology of morally significant
32

SMART & HALDANE, supra note 18, at 136.
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action-positions which seem to be consequences, indeed natural

consequences, of secularism's denials or oversights of God's existence,
or providence, or holiness (purity, steadfastness, and seriousness).
As I have suggested, the first principles of practical understanding, picking out and directing us towards intelligible and intrinsic basic human goods, point towards their explanatory cause in a divine
mind which envisages and makes possible integral human fulfilment,
involving constitutively the cooperation of human free choices. Cor-

respondingly, the denial of any divine mind, or at least of any efficacious divine concern with human fulfilment, is characteristically
accompanied and supported, or at least protected, by a denial that
basic human motivations are a matter of understanding, reason, and
truth at all. At bottom are just the passions, of which practical reason
is the busy and ingenious slave concerned with clever and effective
means for attaining what we emotionally, sub-rationally want. In more
recent philosophy, this Humeian thesis, focused upon the account of
motivation, is transposed into the emotivist account of moral discourse as, notjudgment which can be right or mistaken, but simply an
expression or projection of similarly sub-rational desires and aversions
(including perhaps the desire to get other people to do what you
want). These emotivist theses are scarcely plausible as accounts of psychology or of our discourse. But in their polite, school-teachers'
form, taken for granted by almost every freshman, they provide the
more or less concealed foundations of the claim or assumption that
practical reason is a matter of valuejudgments, and valuejudgments-at least, basic value judgments-are just "a matter of opinion," subjective, not matters of truth on which one could,
consequently, be in error. The professorial counterpart to this received wisdom of the schoolteachers is the self-refuting neo-Nietzschean patter that everything is interpretation and perspective or
viewpoint.
The thought that basic value judgments have no truth scarcely
coheres with, say, the Constitution's proclamation and defence of fundamental human rights. So the polite form taken in this context by
secularism's unreadiness to acknowledge basic human goods as true is
the demand for a kind of constitutional neutrality about them. Counsel for the ACLU opened the oral argument in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey33 by defining the issue as: "Whether our Constitution endows
Government with the power to force a woman to continue or to end a

33

505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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pregnancy against her will .... ,,34 And the Court's judgment repeatedly appealed to the same implicit assumption of neutrality: since it is
obvious that she has a right not to terminate the life within her and not
to be forced to end a pregnancy against her will, she must equally
have the right to terminate that life within, a right not to be prevented
from aborting it. To support this value-neutral autonomy right, the
Court points to a line of cases beginning in 1923 with Meyer v. Nebraska3 5 and running through Pierce v. Society of Sisters36 in 1925, Skinner v. Oklahoma3 7 in 1942, and the dissenting judgment of Justice
Harlan in Poe v. Ullman38 in 1961, before reaching Griswold v. Connecticut 39 in 1965 and Eisenstadt v. Baird40 in 1972. But if one reads these

cases in sequence, it is instantly obvious that the decisions before 1972
utterly reject the conception that politics, government, and law must
preserve neutrality about such basic human goods as education in
good and useful knowledge (goods celebrated in the cases from the
1920s), or marriage (honoured in its procreativity in Skinnerand in its
domesticity and friendship in Harlan's dissent in Poeand even in Griswold). The break comes with the judgment of the radically secularised
Justice Brennan in Eisenstadt v. Baird,which assumes a double neutrality of values and corresponding symmetry of normative judgments:
what is true of sexual relations that express, actualise, and support a
mutual commitment making possible a good environment for children must equally, and obviously, be true of even the most casual act
of lust; and what is true of the decision to try to beget and bear a child
must be true of the decision to prevent the begetting of a child (or, as
Brennan's clerks well understood he meant, 41 to abort the bearing of
a child once begotten). There is just the single neutral category: "the
decision [of the individual, whether married or single,] ...whether to

bear or beget a child. '42 The key word is "whether." What matters,
according to this new, unprecedented, unargued doctrine of the
Court is the ability to decide whether or not ...to do-or instead to
destroy, damage, or impede-something the earlier, pre-secularist
cases confidently identified as of basic human value.
34 NEW YoRK TIMES, April 23, 1992, at B10. For the origins of the argument, see
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (GoldbergJ., concurring).
35 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
36 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
37 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
38 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
39 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
40 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
41

See DAVID J. GARRoxv, LIBERTy' & SEXUALITY 542 (1994).

42

Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (Brennan, J., for the Court).
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The "Philosophers' Brief' to the Supreme Court in the "assisted
suicide" cases (Washington v. Glucksberg4 3 and Vacco v. Quill44 ) takes up
the key sentence from Eisenstadtand deploys a similar argument from
the symmetry and obligatory neutrality between good and evil: since
patients and their doctors must be allowed to try to preserve life to the
end, so they must be allowed to terminate life, at least degraded life, at
their choosing. 45 Since you must be able to choose life, you must be
permitted to choose death. It is as if the Supreme Court in Meyer v.
Nebraska or Pierce v. Society of Sisters had said: since parents have the
right to choose non-State education, they must have the right to
choose for their children no education at all.
Of course, a group of philosophers such as these brief-writers,
John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel and the others, will deny
that they are advancing an emotivist, subjectivist, perspectivalist, or
any other meta-ethical scepticism. They will say that their claim about
neutrality is purely about political rights and the proper competence
of the state's rulers, and the value or dignity of individual autonomy.
And so, on its face, it is. But the weakness of all the arguments which
these philosophers have put forward to justify their claim about individual rights and state competence is good reason to conclude that
their position's real foundation is the concern to be "let alone" to do
what one really feels like.
Rawls, for instance, argued that people behind a Veil of Ignorance-iguorance as to (among other things) intrinsic, non-instrumental human goods-would choose the liberal state-neutralist
principle. But, even on its own terms, the argument depended on
assuming that people are far more risk averse than even self-interested
"prudence" requires. And no reason was given for the crucial Rawlsian assumption that principles which would not be chosen behind a
Veil of Ignorance are unjust principles in the real world of intrinsic,
"thick" but intelligible human goods. 46 And it was on the same undefended assumption that the later Rawls proposed that we should "endorse"-splendid equivocation between "accept as true" and "opt
43 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997).
44 117 S.CL 2293 (1997).
45 Just as it would be intolerable for government to dictate that doctors never be
permitted to try to keep someone alive as long as possible, when that is what the
patient wishes, so it is intolerable for government to dictate that doctors may
never, under any circumstances, help someone to die who believes that further
life means only degradation.

Ronald Dworkin et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers'Brief N.Y. REV. BooKS, March
27, 1997, at 44 n.1 [Philosophers'Brief].
46 SeeJohn Finnis, Legal Enforcement of "Dutiesto Onesel": Kant v. Neo-Kantians, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 433, 434-37 (1987).
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for"!-the "principle" that no argument about either good and bad or
right and wrong should be advanced in public discourse about basic
matters if the argument's acceptability depends upon its being true, all
things considered, (say, philosophically considered). 47 Naturally, he
could give no reason why those who think there are truths about
human goods and rights should judge his "principle of legitimacy"
true. But he did offer an illustration of its reach: the "principle" yields
the conclusion, he said, that no one can have any acceptable reason to
argue against the legal right of women to abort their unborn children
during at least the first three months of life; better still, it enables us to
reach this conclusion without even considering the arguments of
those who contend that these unborn children instantiate the good of
human life, that is, do really have human lives and human rights. 48
The grounds which Ronald Dworkin has offered for state neutralism about basic values are equally weak. If the state were not neutral
about the intrinsic goodness or badness of ways of life, it would deny
equality (of respect). When this first argument was refuted by showing
that equality of respect requires rather than forbids the state to promote good and discourage bad forms of life, Dworkin shifted to a new
one. Such discrimination between good and bad ways of life requires
people to accept a view they cannot accept without abandoning their
self-respect. But this was just as unsound: for restrictions, prohibitions, or taxes on the basis of such a discrimination do not require
those who disagree to accept a view about the good, and do allow
them to keep their self-respect. As Bentham made his boast, one can
combine obedience, even prompt obedience, with free censure (inner
49
or outer) of laws one judges misguided and unjust.

Then there was a series of arguments dependent on ignoring the
law-makers' reasons for action and categorising the law as a mere "ap-

47 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 225 (1993) (["T]he guidelines of inquiry of public reason, as well its principle of legitimacy, have the same basis as the
substantive principles of justice."). For illuminating critiques of Rawls's "principle,"
see, e.g., JOSEPH RAz, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 60-81 (1994).
48 Rawls, supra note 47, at 243 n.32. For comment, see Robert P. George, Public
Reason and Political Conflict: Abortion and Homosexuality, 106 YALE L.J. 2475,
2486-95(1997), which also refutes a similar argumentation byJudithJarvis Thomson.

The similar principle of legitimacy advanced by Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and
Political Legitimacy, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AF. 215, 221 (1987), is vulnerable to the same
critique.
49 On this series of Dworkinian arguments and their refutation, see Finnis, supra
note 46, at 437-38.
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peal to the majority's preferences." 50 The game is to state those preferences from an external viewpoint, as if the individuals who happen
to make up a majority were each concerned only with "following or
imposing majority opinion" rather than with the goods and evils,
rights and wrongs which, according to such an individual's opinion,
are at stake. And the neutralist liberal's game is won by proceeding
asymmetrically, juxtaposing the "majority opinion/will/preference"
(content and rationale unstated) with the content of the threatened
right or value. So, in the Philosophers' covertly euthanasiast Brief, the
reasons or motives of the patient seeking assistance in suicide are
stated from the internal viewpoint of one "who believes that further
life means only degradation," while the reasons for the law against
assisting suicide (and mercy-killing) are stated from an external viewpoint- 'just because that is what some majority thinks proper."'5' In
Romer v. Evans,52 the Colorado Amendment 2 case, the presumption
that the law-making "majority" acts not on reasons but only on subrational preferences, emotions, prejudices, and a will to power was
erected into the very "principle" of decision. Systematically, the majority's judgments and decisions are denied the dignity which, by the
accolade of "autonomy," is accorded to the choices of individuals
whose opportunity to do what they please would be hampered by the
majority's law.
The Philosophers' Brief repeats like a mantra the "mystery" passage(s) from Casey:
[M]atters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life .. . [b]eliefs [which] define the attributes of
53
personhood.
Now one might wonder whether in that passage and the Philosophers' Brief, autonomy is accorded an objectivity which emotivist,
Humeian, or Nietzschean meta-ethics deny to all other values. And
perhaps, in the thoughts of some who appeal to it, autonomy does
have that status. After all, secularism as we know it inhabits the room
50 See the analysis of Dworkin's equivocations on this theme inJohn Finnis, A Bill
of Rightsfor Britain? The Moral of ContemporaryJurisprudence,in 71 PROC. OF THE BRIT.
AcAD. 303, 309-11 (1985).

51 Philosophers'Brief supra note 45, at 44.
52 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
53 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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not only "swept" free but also "furnished"54 by Jewish and Christian
faith-swept free of worldly divinities but furnished with a knowledge
of good and evil, of freely adopted intentions, of the dignity of persons invited to be co-operators with the universe's very source of being, meaning, and value. In this room one finds not only the
autonomy, the self-will of those whose desires are protected by Eisenstadt or Casey or Evans, and the Nietzschean will to power now recovering from the odium it attracted fifty-five to sixty years ago, but also the
earnest, utterly dissimilar autonomy of a Kant, who understood that
autonomy has no dignity unless it is freedom from the rule of the
passions. But Kant also judged that the secularism he mistakenly associates with pure reason must give way to practical reason's "inevitable
postulate" of God as most holy, source of all moral directiveness, and
omnipotent providential source of a final "balance" between happiness and moral worth. 55 So Kant's conception of autonomy-especially when cleared of his own crude empiricist/hedonist psychology,
his expulsion of human free choice to the noumenal unknown, and
his neglect of basic human goods and substantive practical principles-opens a road down which secularism declines to go. Rather
than turn down that way to divine existence, providence, and intention for humankind-truths available to theoretical as well as practical
reason-secularism will embrace the unprincipled freedom to do
what you will which Kant rightly regarded as sub-human and
irrational.
V
Just as secularism obscures the truth of the basic human goods,
reasons for action, first practical principles, differentiated from subrational inclinations and passions, so also is it marked by a pervasive
misunderstanding of intention. Creation, covenant, and the acts of salvation are supreme manifestations of intention, that is, of purpose.
Reflection on the divine perfections makes it clear that the moral and
non-moral evils in the created world, including human defections
from the covenant, are not intended but rather foreseen and permitted since their prevention would entail the loss of great goods. Nor
did Jesus intend or choose his death on the cross; it was not a suicide's
terminating his life as a means to our salvation or anything else, but
instead the free (and salvific) acceptance of that side-effect of his fidelity to his mission of teaching and healing. Secularism characteristi54

See Matthew 12:44; Luke 11:25.

IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMrrs OF REASON ALONE, 4-7 (Theodore M. Greene & Hoyt H. Hudson trans., 1960) (1792) (preface to first edition).
55
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cally collapses that distinction. In the heyday of the Victorian
construction of a new radically secular ethics, the atheist utilitarian
Henry Sidgwick said with characteristic directness: "For purposes of
exact moral orjuristic discussion, it is best to include under the term
'intention' all the consequences of an act that are foreseen as certain
'56
or probable.
Despite its very poor fit with reality, law, and professional ethics,
this artefact-intention collapsed into foresight and causation-is
powerfully attractive to the secularised. The Ninth Circuit's opinion
in Compassion in Dying5 7 was wholly reliant on it. The opinion derided
the American Medical Association's distinction between giving
analgesics with intent to suppress pain and giving them with intent to
kill. It declared that doctors who respect a patient's decision to forgo
life-sustaining treatment intend to hasten their patient's death, that the
laws authorising people to refuse treatment are simply laws for
authorising suicide, and even that laws for preventing suicide have "an
aim" of prolonging a dying person's suffering. The Second Circuit
opinion in Quill v. Vacco 5s followed the same route. In reality, of
course, the New York legislature, in declaring the lawfulness of refusing medical treatment, did not intend to promote or protect any patient's intention to hasten or determine the time of death but
intended rather to protect the intention to be fiee from unwanted
burdens and interventions on the patient's body, even if the patient's
death is a foreseeable consequence. True, the legislature foresaw that
one consequence of its enactment would be that some people would
use, that is, abuse, this right by exercising it with intent to hasten death.
But as a legislative declaration made clear, 59 that was no part of the
legislature's intent-no more than we intend the guilty to escape
when we grant due process of law, or intend lawyers to conspire to lie
when we grant an attorney-client privilege. When we grant or acknowledge a constitutionally protected liberty to testify, we foresee that some
or even most defendants will exploit their right by lying for the purpose of deceiving the jury. Our foresight does not make that deception our aim or a part of the constitutionally protected liberty rightas if that great liberty could be accurately understood as "the right to
lie," and as if counsel, after hearing a client's unambiguous confession
56 HENR

SIDGWICK, THE METHOD OF

ETHICS 202 (7th ed. 1907) (1874).

57 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub.
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
58 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd sub. nom. Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293
(1997).
59 Qui, 80 F.3d at 734 n.7 .
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of guilt, would nevertheless have the constitutional right to put that
client on the stand precisely in order to lie.
This loss of grip on the reality of intention can be found in other
contexts of great significance for our culture, for instance amongst
Catholic theologians. The astonishingly rapid and far-reaching penetration of secularism amongst these moralists took the form, primarily, of adopting the quasi-utilitarian ethic of proportionalism: acts have
their moral character from their end, that is, from a state of affairs
which can be caused by human action, and which makes actions right
when it is judged to promise the greater proportion of overall net
premoral good or the lesser proportion of overall net premoral negative value. With equally astonishing completeness and casualness,
leading theologians in this group-Schueller, Fuchs, Peschke, and
others-began asserting both that the moral norms they were rejecting are about what is "directly" rather than "indirectly" caused, and
that what one causes as a side-effect is a means to the consequences
one seeks to achieve by one's action. Intention virtually disappeared
from their discourse. In the tradition they were seeking to overthrow,
"directly willed" means "intended as an end or chosen or intended as
a means," "indirect" has a corresponding meaning by negation of such
intention, and what is willed as a means is intended. But all this seems
to have become simply unintelligible to these theologians. 60 They
stand before it as uncomprehending (so it would appear) as Ronald
Dworkin reading Justice Scalia's judgment in Cruzan,6 1 noting Scalia's
denial that the distinction between inaction and positive action is
morally decisive, and concluding that Scalia thinks a patient who re62
fuses life-saving amputation must be treated as a suicide.
VI
Utilitarianism (consequentialism, proportionalism) is the peculiar symbol of secularism in reaction against but still illuminated (as I
have already suggested) by the after-glow of Christian faith. It is an
"ism," an ideal, aspiring to much more than the "eat, drink, and be
merry," or the opportunistic libido dominandi,which are the untutored
outcome of much unbelief. There is nothing new about Machiavellian politics or about the thought that it is better for one innocent to
60 See JOHN FiNNims, MORAL ABsoLuTEs 74-77 (1991). For a recent example of
such incomprehension, see Jean Porter, "Direct"and "Indirect" in Grisez's Moral Theory,
57 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 611-32 (1996), especially 621-27.
61 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
62 SeeJohn Finnis, The "Value of Human Life" and "The Right to Death" Some Reflections on Cruzan and Ronald Thworkin, 17 S. ILL. U. LJ. 559, 565 (1993).
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be killed "lest the people perish." But there is something new in ethics, these past 200 years, and it is utilitarianism or, more generally,
consequentialism (or, more narrowly, religiose proportionalism).
Consequentialism is radically incompatible with belief in divine
providence. For consequentialism's supreme or indeed single practical principle is to pursue states of affairs embodying greater overall
net good. But the doctrine of divine providence is that God permits
what is bad only to draw from it good and more good. So the principle taken with the doctrine yields the practical norm: Try anything!
Do whatever you like! (For whether your project succeeds or falls, the
result will providentially have promoted overall long-run net good.)
But consequentialism is proposed as an ethics. So it does not tell us to
do whatever we feel like. So, to avoid the reductio ad absurdum, it must
suppress or ignore belief in divine providence.
Indeed, when one reflects on the phenomenon of consequentialism, one comes, I think, to see it as, wittingly or otherwise, an attempt
to replace divine with human providence, not in retail (as with the
differentiation of secular from sacred that comes with all particular
technical competences, as in agriculture, sewerage, or medicine) but
wholesale, across the board. Though proposed as an ethics, its conception of deliberation does not belong to what Aristotle and Aquinas
identified as ethical or moral practical reasoning, in which various irreducibly basic goods, each an aspect of the flourishing of human persons, are pursued in the unbounded horizon of "human existence as a
whole." Instead, consequentialism adopts the form of technical reasoning, in which we seek the means which will effectively achieve an
attainable goal, and can measure every action against alternatives for
their respective cost-benefit efficiency.
Haunted by the inherent problems of incommensurability among
the basic goods, by the future's unforeseeability, and by risk's incommensurability with value, consequentialism needs to make rational
commensuration and aggregation seem possible in the real, open horizon of morally significant choice. Firstly, then, it characteristically
tries to eliminate the multiplicity of substantive basic human goods,
and deal instead in a single maximand such as pleasure, or alternatively the absence of pain, or alternatively "preferences" of any and
every kind, or money value, or whatever. But this commensuration
alone is not enough; the aggregation requires a bottom line, and so
the real, unbounded horizon of human existence is characteristically
blocked off, in consequentialist deliberation, by the adoption-necessarily arbitrary, on consequentialism's own assumptions-of some delimited horizon: my country's survival and prosperity during the
lifetime of me and my children, or something of that sort.
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Nor should we be surprised to find consequentialism also blocking off awareness of the reality of free choice-for two reasons. First,
free choice is always between alternative, incompatible proposals each
of which offers something attractive to practical reason. But if consequentialist aggregation could be done, it would identify one proposal
as promising all the benefits of the others plus some more (including
more certain) benefits; and then there would remain no possibility of
rationally choosing any of the proposals that offer less (including less
certain) benefits. One would simply assent to the proposal promising
maximum net good, and spontaneously begin putting into effect. So
consequentialism is incoherent with its own undertaking to guide deliberation towards morally significant choice.
Second, if there is to be any computation of overall net good, and
at least the appearance of aggregability, consequentialism will have to
ignore the implications of free choice for moral character. For the
shaping of character by free choices is an inherent, intransitive sideeffect, so to speak, of the spiritual aspect of the making of free
choices. Such choices not only initiate their own transitive effectstheir execution-but also last, endure, subsist and persist in the soul,
the character, of the chooser until such time, if ever, as they are reversed by a new and incompatible choice; for example, to repent of
them and to resolve not to make them again. And this perduring of
choices in character-perhaps the most valuable theme of Karol
Wojtyla's own philosophical work-is a consequence of choices which
is clearly incommensurable in significance, value, or disvalue with
those choices' transitive consequences, that is their consequences
outside the acting person's will and character. So it is no accident
that the founders of utilitarianism were determinists.
And secularists. For secularism of one kind, the whole consequentialist method or cluster of ethical methods is attractive because
it promises to dissolve all moral norms which exclude cheating and
killing, and obstruct me in doing what I want. For secularism of another kind, consequentialism is attractive because it seems to be implied by concern for "overall" human or sentient good. For
secularised religious people, proportionalism offers both these
attractions.
The attractiveness of consequentialism was of course immensely
enhanced by its cultural context: it is in essence an extrapolation, certainly unwarranted and sometimes apparently hubristic, from the successes and the genuine utility of technologies. Quasi-technical
economics, game theory, and the like, each suggest a reductive model
for all practical thinking. So that extrapolated, reductivist model is
found in many parts of our culture. We find, for example, that the
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Model Penal Code and some of the Restatements of the law were consciously modelled in some respects on utilitarian suppositions about
action and value. And then, in quite another context, we find a
scarcely secularist Christian philosopher like Maritain asserting that
Christians have a "temporal mission" quickened by a "terrestrial hope"
which must "have as its comprehensive aim the ideal of building a
63
better or a new Christian civilization."
Does anyone's temporal vocation require a "comprehensive aim"?
It seems to me a mistake to suppose that practical thought is impotent
unless guided by such far-reaching envisagings of vast future states of
affairs capable of being built up by efficient human effort. The envisaging or imagining of such states of affairs is not a prerequisite for our
being oriented and motivated by concern for the common good of
our communities (family, neighbourhood, cultural, political), a complex good involving respect for rights and, as I have suggested against
"neutral liberalism," a substantive conception or range of conceptions
of individual and communal flourishing. As it seeks to save itself from
collapsing into nihilism, secularist thought-burdened as it is (as I
have tried to show) with all its misunderstandings of human good and
human action-will always be tempted (as this century has amply
shown) by the envisaging of vast "goals" or "comprehensive aims," and
by the passionate experience of technical efforts to achieve them:
Ten-year Plans, wars for carving out a Thousand-year Empire's living
space, and such like. These and all other such this-worldly hopes
seem to correspond, obscurely and deviantly, to the hope for the only
really possible and worthwhile "comprehensive goal," the Kingdom
'64
which we are called upon to "Seek first."
If we are right to accept it as true that providence includes divine
revelation and God's extra-ordinary personal action in history, we are
authorised to hope that that Kingdom will include-as Vatican II puts
it in a fresh articulation of the givens of Scripture and Tradition-all
the good fruits of human efforts made in obedience to the norms of
truth and justice, love and peace, 65 even when such obedience had no
comprehensive secular goal, and seemed to end in failure, perhaps
63 JACQUES MARITAIN, ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

122

(1959). He goes on:

At each new age in human history (as is, to my mind, our own age with
respect to the Middle Ages and the Baroque Age), it is normal that Christians hope for a new Christendom, and depict for themselves, in order to
guide their effort, a concrete historical ideal appropriate to the particular
climate of the age in question.

Id at 123.
64 Matthew 6:33.
65 Vatican II, Gaudium et Spes sec. 39.
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even thorough-going failure, to achieve what one had hoped to do in

this life.

